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Abstract
This study constructs a variety expansion growth model with public research spending,
in which public researchers raise the productivity of private R&D. We show that the rela-
tionship between public research spending and the growth rate follows an inverted U-shape.
This is because public research spending increases private R&D productivity, but crowds
out labor input to private R&D. It is also shown that the welfare-maximizing level of pub-
lic research spending is below the growth-maximizing level. With regards to tax policy, a
zero-prot tax maximizes both growth and welfare. Finally, the study analyzes the stability
of the steady state, showing that the equilibrium is indeterminate when the government's
revenue source depends on asset income tax.
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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that productive government spending plays an important role in eco-
nomic growth. Arrow and Kurz (1970) were the rst to study this issue using growth models.
They focused on infrastructure, such as highways, airports, railroads, and electrical facilities,
and introduced the notion of productive public capital. However, in their model, growth is de-
termined by exogenous factors. In terms of endogenous growth models, Barro (1990) presented
the seminal model that includes productive government spending. He assumes that public ser-
vices raise the productivity of private rms. Under this setting, the social rate of return on
private capital becomes constant, and the long-run growth rate is determined endogenously.
As a result, we have been able to investigate the relationship between productive government
spending and the long-run growth rate. While Barro (1990) treats government spending as a
ow variable, many studies have extended the Barro model by introducing the stock of pub-
lic capital and examining the eects of public capital (see Futagami et al., 1993; Fisher and
Turnovsky, 1998).1,2
Although many studies analyze the eects of productive government spending on economic
growth, the Schumpeterian growth models developed by Romer (1990), Grossman and Help-
man (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) focus mainly on the activities of private R&D rms
motivated by monopoly prot. However, many empirical studies argue that the public research
sector is an important factor in economic growth. For instance, Manseld (1991) nds that 10%
of the innovations in the United States between 1975 and 1985 could not have been developed,
or could have developed with great delay, without academic research. Caloghirou et al. (2001)
analyzed over 6,000 research joint ventures in 42 nations that received funding from the Euro-
pean Commission during the period 1983-1996. They found that 65% of research joint ventures
involved one or more universities. Based on the Swedish Community Innovation Survey, Loof
and Brostrom (2008) found that university collaboration has a positive inuence on the inno-
vative activity of large manufacturing rms. On the other hand, few theoretical studies have
considered public research policy from a macroeconomic perspective. Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994) present a model in which the stock of technological knowledge depends upon public re-
search, but the model does not allow for private R&D. In contrast, Park (1998) considers both
1Futagami et al. (1993) developed an endogenous growth model with productive public capital, and show
dierent results to those of Barro (1990). Since their model includes two stock variables, it has transition
dynamics. The growth-maximizing tax rate is the same as that of Barro (1990), but the welfare-maximizing tax
rate is lower than that of Barro (1990). Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) suppose that public capital has a congestion
eect. They show there is a trade-o between the degree of congestion and the substitutability between public
and private capital in production.
2An extensive survey of the literature is provided by Irmen and Kuehnel (2009).
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public and private research. Public research indirectly contributes to market production by
inuencing the knowledge accumulation of private R&D. However, the study is more concerned
with open economy issues and international spillovers than public research policy. In order
to analytically examine the growth and welfare eects of public research spending, this study
incorporates public researchers who raise the productivity of private R&D in a variety expan-
sion model, following the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991). The government expends
public research spending and interest from government debt, but raises funds from taxes on
asset income, consumption, and corporate prot.3
In this study, we obtained the following three main results. First, the relationship between
public research spending and the growth rate follows an inverted U-shape. That is, growth-
maximizing public research spending exists. The inverted U-shaped relationship occurs because
public research spending raises the productivity of private R&D, but crowds out the labor input
to private R&D. In addition, only the tax on prot has a negative eect on growth because
an increase in the tax rate decreases monopoly prot, which is the rate of return for setting
up new rms. Thus, a zero-prot tax maximizes growth and the government should nance
expenditure by taxing asset income and consumption.
Second, the welfare-maximizing level of public research spending is lower than the growth-
maximizing level. In this study, welfare is driven by households' consumption expenditure and
the growth of dierentiated goods (i.e., love of variety). While public research spending and the
growth rate follow an inverted U-shape, households' consumption expenditure decreases with an
increase in public research spending. This is because higher public research spending implies a
heavier tax burden on households, so reducing their consumption expenditure. Therefore, there
is a trade-o between households' consumption expenditure and the growth of dierentiated
goods. This trade-o leads to the welfare-maximizing level of public research spending being
below the growth-maximizing level. With regards to tax policy, a zero-prot tax maximizes
welfare because a decrease in prot tax increases growth, which increases welfare.
Third, an increase in asset income tax raises the possibility of indeterminacy, whereas an
increase in government debt, consumption, and prot tax decreases the possibility of indetermi-
nacy.4 Some related studies have also pointed out the possibility that indeterminacy depends
on scal policies (e.g., Guo and Harrison, 2008; Kamiguchi and Tamai, 2011). Guo and Har-
rison (2008) show that the presence of productive government spending and the distortion by
3Many theoretical studies have investigated the scal policy of productive public spending with debt nancing.
For example, see Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), Greiner and Semmler (2000), Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004),
Futagami et al. (2008), Yakita (2008), Maebayashi et al. (2013), and Morimoto et al. (2013).
4In this study, indeterminacy means we cannot select a continuum of equilibrium trajectories that all converge
on the same steady state.
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taxes aect the possibility of indeterminacy. This implies that nancing government spending
using distortionary taxes might bring about equilibrium indeterminacy. Then, Kamiguchi and
Tamai (2011) show that income tax nancing has a greater inuence on indeterminacy than
the presence of productive government spending. It seems that the ndings in these studies are
similar to those of this study. However, these studies use real business cycle models, not an
endogenous growth model, and so do not consider the eect of government debt. In fact, few
studies examine the relationship between the debt policy rule and equilibrium indeterminacy.
Futagami et al. (2008) shows that, in a closed economy model of endogenous growth with public
services and a debt policy, the high growth steady state can be equilibrium indeterminate when
the long-run debt-private capital ratio is suciently high. Morimoto et al. (2013) show that, in
a small open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital and a debt policy, equi-
librium indeterminacy arises when the long-run debt-GDP ratio is suciently high.5 In contrast
to these studies, this study shows that equilibrium indeterminacy arises when government debt
is suciently small.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the model used in this
study. Section 3 derives the equilibrium and dynamics of the economy. Section 4 examines
the stability of the steady state. Section 5 analyzes the policy eect on economic growth and
Section 6 investigates the policy eect on welfare. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
There is a unit continuum of identical households. Each household supplies one unit of in-
elastic labor supply. The factor market is perfectly competitive, while the goods market is
monopolistically competitive, as explained below. The households have perfect foresight.
2.1 Households
The households maximize the following lifetime utility:
U0 
Z 1
0
e t logCtdt; (1)
where Ct represents an instantaneous utility derived from the consumption of a composite good
and  > 0 is a rate of time preference. Ct is given by
Ct =
Z Nt
0
ct(j)
" 1
" dj
 "
" 1
; (2)
5Maebayashi et al. (2013) show that, in a closed economy model of endogenous growth with public capital
and a debt policy, equilibrium indeterminacy never arises.
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where ct(j) denotes the consumption of good j and Nt denotes the number of available varieties.
We assume that " > 1. " is the elasticity of substitution between any two products. Denoting
the expenditure of the households as Et =
R Nt
0 Pt(j)ct(j)dj, we obtain the demand function for
good j as follows:
ct(j) =
Pt(j)
 "EtR Nt
0 Pt(i)
1 "di
; (3)
where Pt(j) is the price of good j, and PD;t is the price index, dened as
PD;t =
Z Nt
0
Pt(i)
1 "di
 1
1 "
: (4)
Then, the maximization problem for households is as follows:
max U0
subject to _At = (1  tA)rtAt +Wt   (1 + tE)Et;
where At, rt, and Wt represent the households' asset holding, rate of return on assets, and wage
rate. The wage rate is the numeraire, and thus Wt = 1. The government taxes asset income
at rate tA 2 [0; 1) and consumption at rate tE  0. Substituting (3) into (2), we obtain the
indirect sub-utility function as follows:
Ct =
Et
PD;t
: (5)
The maximization subject to the intertemporal budget constraint yields the following Euler
equation:
_Et
Et
= (1  tA)rt   : (6)
2.2 Firms
This subsection considers producer behavior. Producers undertake two distinct activities. They
create blueprints for new varieties of dierentiated goods, and manufacture the dierentiated
goods that have been created by R&D.
We assume that each dierentiated good is produced by a single rm because the good is
innitely protected by a patent. We further assume that one unit of labor input produces one
unit of a dierentiated good. The rm manufacturing good j (rm j) maximizes its after-tax
prot:
(1  t)t(j) = (1  t)
 
Pt(j)Xt(j) Xt(j)

; (7)
where Xt(j) and t 2 [0; 1) represent the output for rm j and the tax rate on prot. Then
rm j charges the following price:
Pt(j) =
"
"  1 = P: (8)
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Therefore, all goods are priced equally. Pricing rules (8) and (3) yield Xt(j) = Xt = ("  
1)Et="Nt. Then, the per brand operating prots are as follows:
t =
Et
"Nt
: (9)
The no-arbitrage condition is given by
(1  tA)rt = (1  t)t
vt
+
_vt
vt
; (10)
where vt denotes the value of a rm.
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Next, we consider the technology involved in developing a new good.7 R&D rms create
blueprints and expand the varieties of goods available for consumption. We assume that R&D
activity needs labor input. Because the knowledge that has already been produced includes all
that is needed for invention, greater knowledge means further invention. Since the knowledge
is non-rival and non-excludable, an expansion in the number of varieties reduces the labor
input. Furthermore, we incorporate public researchers into the model. Public research activities
enhance the productivity of private R&D through a variety channel (for example, publications,
scientic reports, conferences, research joint ventures, and university collaboration). We assume
the following production function for R&D:
_Nt = f(Gt)NtLR;t; (11)
where Gt and LR;t represent the number of public researchers and the amount of labor devoted
to R&D. In addition, we postulate that f satises the following conditions:
f(0) > 0 and f 0(Gt) > 0 and f 00(Gt) < 0:
We assume that rms freely enter into the R&D race. Therefore, the free entry condition is
given by
vt =
1
f(Gt)Nt
, _Nt > 0: (12)
Equation (12) shows that an increase in Gt decreases vt. The reasoning is as follows. Greater
R&D productivity creates an excess supply of blueprints. In a competitive market, theWalrasian
adjustment mechanism reduces the patent value, vt.
2.3 Government
The government taxes asset income, consumption, and corporate prot. We assume that the
respective tax rates are held constant over time, and that the government maintains its debt,
6Note that prot tax can be translated as dividend tax.
7See Grossman and Helpman (1991) for more details of the R&D process.
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B, at the constant level. Therefore, the government nances public research spending and the
interest on the debt. As a result, it satises the budget constraint
Gt + rt B = tArtAt + tEEt + ttNt: (13)
Note that B = 0 implies a balanced budget.8,9
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Dynamics
Labor is used for production, private R&D, and the employment of public researchers. The
labor market equilibrium becomes
NtXt + LR;t +Gt = 1: (14)
From (12), the asset market equilibrium is as follows:
At = B +Ntvt = B +
1
f(Gt)
: (15)
From (9), (12), and (14), the no-arbitrage condition (10) becomes:
(1  tA)rt =

1  t
"

f(Gt)Et   f(Gt)(1 Gt)  f
0(Gt)
f(Gt)
_Gt: (16)
By using (9), (13), (15), and (16), we obtain
f 0(Gt)
f(Gt)
_Gt =

1  t
"

f(Gt)Et   f(Gt)(1 Gt) + 1
t

tE +
t
"

Et  Gt

; (17)
where t  tA=f(1  tA)f(Gt)g   B. From (12), (16), and (17), Euler equation (6) becomes:
_Et
Et
=
1
t

Gt  

tE +
t
"

Et

  : (18)
Equations (17) and (18) formulate the autonomous dynamic system with respect to Et and Gt.
8Our main results do not change if the government uses a debt policy rule following that of Futagami et al.
(2008). In that case, the budget constraint of the government is as follows:
Gt + rtBt = tArtAt + tEEt + ttNt + _Bt:
The government adjusts its debt according to the following rule:
_Bt =  (Bt   B);
where B and  denote the target level of government debt and the adjustment coecient of the rule, respectively.
9If B < 0, the government lends to households and earns interest.
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3.2 Steady state
In this section, we examine the steady state of the economy. Henceforth, we omit time index,
t. Imposing _E = _G = 0 in (17) and (18), respectively, results in
tE +
t
"

E = G  ; (19)
 =

1  t
"

f(G)E   f(G)(1 G): (20)
By eliminating E from equations (19) and (20), we have
B =

tA
1  tA +
tE +
t
"
1  t"

1
f(G)
+
1


tE +
t
"
1  t"
  1 + tE
1  t"
G

 (G): (21)
As shown in Figure 1, the intersection of the LHS and RHS of (21) determines the steady state
value, G.10 The steady state value E is obtained from (19), as follows:
E =
1
1  t"

(1 G) + 
f(G)

: (22)
Figure 1 Figure 2
From (11), (14), and (22), the growth rate at the steady state is given by
 
 _N
N

=
1
"  t
n
(1  t)f(G)(1 G)  ("  1)
o
: (23)
Moreover, we assume a positive growth rate at G = 0, as follows:
jG=0 = 1
"  t
n
(1  t)f(0)  ("  1)
o
> 0: (24)
10x represents the steady state value of variable x.
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Dierentiating  with respect to G, we obtain
@
@G
=
1  t
"  t
n
f 0(G)(1 G)  f(G)
o
: (25)
From the assumption of f , @=@G is decreasing in G.11 Assuming that f 0(0) > f(0), there
exists public research spending that satises f 0(G)(1 G)  f(G) = 0. We dene G as Gg,
which yields the following relation:
@
@G
R 0 , G Q Gg: (26)
Therefore, we can illustrate the graph of (23) as shown in Figure 2. As shown by (26), the
relationship between the growth rate and G follows an inverted U-shape, and the growth-
maximizing public research spending is Gg. From Figure 2, the growth rate becomes 0 if G
 is
suciently large. In this case, R&D is not undertaken since a suciently large value of G makes
labor input to private R&D zero. Here, G^ is dened as jG=G^ = 0. In Figure 1, we assume that
the growth rate is positive in a balanced budget ( B = 0), that is, Gj B=0 < G^. Furthermore,
to focus on the positive growth rate and G  0, we impose the following condition:
(G^) < B  (0):
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1
There is a positive growth steady state in this economy if (G^) < B  (0). In addition, if
f 0(0) > f(0), there exists a positive growth-maximizing level of public research spending, Gg.
We next study the detailed relationship between the growth rate and public research spend-
ing at the steady state. From (11), the growth rate,  = f(G)LR, is determined by f(G
)
and LR. Dierentiating 
 with respect to G yields
@
@G
= f 0(G)LR + f(G
)
@LR
@G
:
While the eect of the productivity of R&D is positive, f 0(G) > 0, the eect of labor input,
@LR=@G
, is ambiguous. From (14), labor input in private R&D at the steady state is given by
LR = 1 G   " 1" E. Dierentiating LR with respect to G yields
@LR
@G
=  1  "  1
"
@E
@G
: (27)
11Dierentiating @=@G with respect to G yields
@2
@G2
=
1  t
"  t
n
f 00(G)(1 G)  2f 0(G)
o
< 0:
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The rst term represents a direct crowding-out eect on private R&D labor input, and the
second term represents the eect of labor demand on production, which depends on households'
consumption expenditure. To more precisely investigate the eect of the second term, we
dierentiate E with respect to G, as follows:
@E
@G
=
1
1  t"

 1   f
0(G)
(f(G))2

< 0: (28)
Thus, E is decreasing in G. Since higher public research spending implies a heavier tax
burden on households, an increase in public research spending reduces households' consumption
expenditure. Then, we examine the value of G that crowds out private R&D labor input. From
(27) and (28), we obtain
@LR
@G
=
1
"  t

 (1  t) + ("  1) f
0(G)
(f(G))2

:
From the assumption of f , f 0(G)=(f(G))2 is decreasing in G.12 We dene ~G as f 0( ~G)=(f( ~G))2 =
(1  t)=("  1). Then we obtain the following relation:
@LR
@G
R 0 , G Q ~G:
When G < ~G, the eect of labor demand on production exceeds the direct crowding-out
eect; and @LR=@G
 > 0 holds.13 In contrast, when G > ~G, the direct crowding-out eect is
suciently large; so @LR=@G
 < 0 holds. Next, we compare Gg to ~G. Substituting G = ~G
into (25) yields
@
@G

G= ~G
= f 0( ~G)LRjG= ~G > 0:
Therefore, from (26), we have ~G < Gg.
We summarize these results as follows. If G < Gg, the eect of an increase in R&D
productivity exceeds the crowding-out eect, and thus an increase in G raises the growth
rate. However, if G > Gg, the crowding-out eect exceeds the eect of an increase in R&D
productivity. In this case, an increase in G decreases the growth rate. From these results, the
growth rate and G follow an inverted U-shape.
Finally, we have to consider the condition of Gg > 0 that corresponds to f
0(0) > f(0).
From the above discussion, if the productivity eect is larger than the crowding-out eect at
G = 0, there exists a positive growth-maximizing level of public research spending. On the
other hand, if the crowding-out eect is larger than the productivity eect at G = 0, public
research spending crowds out private R&D input, that is, there is no need for public research
spending.
12Dierentiating f 0(G)=(f(G))2 with respect to G yields

f 00(G)f(G)  2(f 0(G))2	=(f(G))3 < 0.
13Note that ~G can be a negative value. In this case, there is no crowding-in eect.
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4 Stability
We examine the local stability at the steady state. Approximating (17) and (18) linearly in the
neighborhood of the steady states, we obtain
_G
_E

=

JGG JGE
JEG JEE

G G
E  E

:
Here, Jij (i; j = G;E) denotes entities in the Jacobian matrix of this system (see Appendix A
for more detail):
JGG =   f(G
)
f 0(G)

1 + 
tA
1  tA
f 0(G)
(f(G))2

;
JGE =
f(G)
f 0(G)

1  t
"

f(G) +

tE +
t
"

;
JEG =
E


1 + 
tA
1  tA
f 0(G)
(f(G))2

;
JEE =  

tE +
t
"
E

;
where  = tA=f(1  tA)f(G)g   B.14 The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, J , are dened
as i (i = 1; 2). Here, 1 and 2 are the roots of the characteristic equation, 
2   (JGG +
JEE) + JGGJEE   JGEJEG = 0. To check the stability, we investigate the sign of detJ =
JGGJEE   JGEJEG as follows:
detJ =   f(G
)E
f 0(G)

f(G) + 
tA
1  tA
f 0(G)
f(G)

:
Because the sign of the square bracket is positive, the sign of detJ is determined by the sign
of . When  > 0, the sign of detJ is negative. We then have 1 > 0 and 2 < 0. In this
case, the steady state is saddle-point stable. Since E and G are ow variables, the equilibrium
is indeterminate.
On the other hand, when  < 0, the sign of detJ is positive. In this case, we must examine
the sign of trJ = JGG + JEE , as follows:
trJ =   1


1  t
"
 f(G)
f 0(G)
+ 
tA
1  tA
1
f(G)
+

tE +
t
"

E

:
Since  < 0 implies trJ > 0, the eigenvalues of J have positive real parts. Thus, the steady
state is unstable, that is, the equilibrium is determinate. From these results, we can state the
following proposition:
14If  = 0, the economy jumps to the steady state immediately. See Appendix B for more detail.
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Proposition 2
The equilibrium is indeterminate if  > 0, while determinate if   0.
In this study, G is determined by the government's budget constraint, that is, G is af-
fected by the scal variables. Therefore, from the denition of , the scal variables inuence
the value of . We next examine the relationship between  and the scal variables. To
begin with, we investigate the eects of the scal variables on G through changes in the scal
variables. As shown in Appendix C, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma
The eects of changes in policy variables B and ti (i = A;E; ) are as follows:
@G
@ B
< 0;
@G
@ti
> 0:
An increase in B raises the interest payment on debt, and G decreases. Meanwhile, an
increase in ti (i = A;E; ) raises government revenue, and G
 increases. By using the Lemma,
we examine the eects of  through changes in the scal variables. As shown in Appendix D,
we obtain the following relationship:
@
@ B
< 0;
@
@tA
> 0;
@
@ti
< 0: (i = E; )
From these results and Proposition 2, an increase in tA increases the possibility of indeterminacy,
whereas an increase in tE , t and B reduces the possibility of indeterminacy. In addition, we
consider the following extreme cases:
 =
tA
1  tA
1
f(G)
  B > 0; B  0; tA; tE ; t > 0;
 =
1

G > 0; tE = t = 0; B; tA > 0;
 =   B < 0; tA = 0; B; tE ; t > 0:
When B = tA = 0 is a special case, because 
 = 0. In this case, we have to reconsider the
equilibrium dynamics and stability. Appendix B shows the steady state is unstable, that is, the
equilibrium is determinate. In summary, we can state the following corollary:
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Corollary (Local Stability)
When tA is suciently large and tE, t, and B are suciently small, the equilibrium is inde-
terminate. On the other hand, when tA is suciently small and tE, t, and B are suciently
large, the equilibrium is determinate.
To investigate the intuitive explanation of indeterminacy, suppose that the initial level of
G is larger than the steady state level of public research spending, G, which increases the
productivity of R&D.15 From (12), the value of a rm, v, decreases. From (11) and (12), the
no-arbitrage condition is given by
(1  tA)r = (1  t)
v
  f(G)LR   f
0(G)
f(G)
_G:
In this case, the rst term of the RHS of this condition increases. The second term changes
slightly. This is because an increase in G reduces the labor input to R&D, LR, and this partly
osets the increase in f(G). If the government does not change the tax rates, _G > 0 cannot
satisfy the budget constraint in the long run. Therefore, _G < 0 holds, and the third term of the
RHS becomes positive. From these results, an increase in G raises the interest rate, r.16
Using this result, we provide an intuitive explanation of indeterminacy. Suppose that the
economy is in a steady state and households expect the government to raise G. This expectation
implies that households also expect an increase in r. Households then have a higher incentive to
save. As a result, households' asset holding, A, increases and their expenditure, E, decreases.
Under these circumstances, we can think of the government budget constraint as:
G = tArA  r B| {z }
(1 tA)r
+

tE +
t
"

E: (29)
From equation (29), when the government's interest payment exceeds the asset income tax
revenue,   0 holds.17 This implies that the government's revenue source depends on con-
sumption/prot tax nancing. In this case, since tA is suciently small, the eect of a reduction
in E exceeds that of an increase in A, and the government then decreases G. Thus, the house-
holds' expectations are not self-fullling; that is, the equilibrium is determinate. On the other
hand,  > 0 implies that the asset income tax revenue is sucient to nance the interest pay-
ment and the government's revenue source depends on asset income tax nancing. In this case,
since tA is suciently large, an increase in A will raise G. In this case, households' expectations
can be self-fullling and the equilibrium is indeterminate.
15Note that this increase in G is not caused by the scal policy change.
16Intuitively, when the price of a patent, v, decreases, the demand for the patent becomes higher than the
risk-free asset. This raises the interest rate, r, because the no-arbitrage condition must hold.
17We can derive tArA  r B = (1  tA)r from (15) and the denition of .
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5 Growth-Maximizing Policy
In this section, we investigate the policy maximizing the long-run growth rate. Equation (23)
implies that only prot tax is a distorting tax, and that asset income/consumption tax can be
equivalent to a lump-sum tax. We dierentiate  with respect to t, under given G, as follows
@
@t

Ggiven
=   "  1
("  t)2
n
f(G)(1 G) + 
o
< 0:
Thus, a decrease in t raises the graph of the RHS of (23). From (25) and (26), the growth-
maximizing public research spending is Gg, regardless of t. These relations are shown in
Figure 3. By using these results, Proposition 1, and the Lemma, we can now state the following
proposition representing the growth-maximizing policy.
Proposition 3
If f 0(0) > f(0), the policy mix of t = 0 and B = (Gg) maximizes the long-run growth rate.
Figure 3
Proposition 3 states that the government should not levy corporate prots and nance
its spending through asset income/consumption taxation. This is because prot tax has a
negative growth eect by reducing the rate of return to setting up new rms. Furthermore,
13
(Gg) is increasing in tA and tE . This implies that larger government debt needs a larger asset
income/consumption tax rate.
In the Barro model, when the government imposes tax only on household income, there
exists a growth-maximizing government spending level. Meanwhile, when the government is
able to use consumption or lump-sum tax, the growth rate is increasing in productive govern-
ment spending. In other words, there is no growth-maximizing government spending level.18
This implies that Proposition 3 is dierent to Barro's results. The reasoning is as follows. In
the Barro model, when the government raises productive government spending, the produc-
tion of the nal output increases. Because the government transforms the nal output into a
productive input, an increase in the available resources can be devoted to further productive
government spending. Thus, if the government can use a non-distortionary tax, the growth
rate is increasing in government spending.19 On the other hand, in this study, public research
spending requires labor input. Since the total labor supply is constant over time, larger public
research spending crowds out private R&D input, as discussed in Subsection 3.2. Therefore,
there exists a growth-maximizing public research spending level, even if the government is able
to use a non-distortionary tax.
6 Welfare-Maximizing Policy
In this section, we investigate the welfare level of the steady state. In the steady state, (2), (5),
and (8) yield
logC = logE +
1
"  1
t+ log
"  1
"

N
1
" 1
0 :
Without any loss of generality, we set ("   1)N
1
" 1
0 =" = 1. If indeterminacy occurs, the eect
of the welfare-maximizing policy is ambiguous. To focus on the determinate equilibrium, we
impose the following condition using the denition of  and (D.1).
Condition : Determinate equilibrium
tA 
B
1
f(G) +
B
or tE +
t
"
 (1 + tE)G


f(G) + 1
:
18A detailed explanation is provided by Irmen and Kuehnel (2009).
19If the government's revenue source depends on only a distortionary income tax, an increase in productive
government spending can decrease the after-tax private marginal product of private capital through a necessary
increase in the distortionary income tax. Therefore, there exists a growth-maximizing government spending level.
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Note that this condition implies that   0. Since the economy jumps to the steady state,
the welfare level at the steady state is calculated by
U =
1

logE +
1
2("  1)
: (30)
Dierentiating U with respect to G, we obtain
@U
@G
=
1
E
@E
@G
+
1
2("  1)
@
@G
: (31)
From the fact that the relationship between  and G is an inverted U-shape (see Figure 2)
and E is decreasing in G (see Equation (28)), we can depict equation (30) in (G; U) space,
as shown in Figure 4. If the growth eect, @=@G, is suciently large, U and G follow an
inverted U-shape (see Figure 4-1).20 In contrast, if the growth eect is suciently small, U is
decreasing in G (see Figure 4-2).
Figure 4-1 : the growth eect is large Figure 4-2 : the growth eect is small
We next consider the welfare-maximizing policy. From (22), (23), and (30), only the prot
tax is a distorting tax and the asset income/consumption tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax,
as discussed in Section 5. Thus, dierentiating U with respect to t, under given G, we obtain
@U
@t

Ggiven
=
1
2("  t)2(G
);
where
(G)  ("  1  t)  f(G)(1 G):
Then, we investigate the sign of (G) under _N > 0 (i.e., 0  G < G^). Appendix E shows
that the sign of (G) is negative when 0  G < G^. Thus, the sign of @U=@t

Ggiven is
20We derive this condition later.
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also negative. Analogous to the discussion of the growth-maximization policy, a decrease in the
prot tax raises the graph of the RHS of (30) (see Figure 4-1) and the optimum can be attained
by setting the prot tax to zero.
Finally, we derive the welfare-maximizing public research spending level. By setting t = 0
and using (25), (28), and (31), we obtain
@U
@G
=
1
E

 1   f
0(G)
(f(G))2

+
1
2"("  1)
n
f 0(G)(1 G)  f(G)
o
 1


(G): (32)
From Figure 4, when welfare-maximizing public research spending exists, the sign of @U=@G
at G = 0 becomes positive (i.e., the growth eect is suciently large at G = 0). Hence, the
existence condition of positive welfare-maximizing public research spending becomes as follows:

(0) =
1
1 + f(0)

 1   f
0(0)
(f(0))2

+
1
"("  1)

f 0(0)  f(0)

> 0: (33)
When " and  are suciently small, and f 0(0) is suciently large, 
(0) > 0 holds (see Appendix
F for more detail). Let us dene Gw by 
(Gw) = 0. In this case, @U
=@G R 0 holds when
G Q Gw (see Figure 4-1), and thus Gw represents the welfare-maximizing public research
spending. However, if 
(0)  0, then @U=@G < 0 holds (see Figure 4-2). In this case, G = 0
maximizes the welfare. Furthermore, we can compare the welfare-maximizing level of public
research spending with the growth-maximizing level. Substituting G = Gg into (32) yields
@U
@G

G=Gg
=
1
E

 1   f
0(Gg)
(f(Gg))2

< 0:
Therefore, we can see that the welfare-maximizing level of public research spending is lower
than the growth-maximizing level. In summary, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 4
If 
(0) > 0, the policy mix of t = 0 and B = (Gw) maximizes welfare. In addition, the
welfare-maximizing level of public research spending is below the growth-maximizing level.
In line with Proposition 3, Proposition 4 states that the government should not levy a tax
on corporate prot and nance its spending through asset income/consumption taxation. From
(30), welfare is driven by household consumption expenditure and the growth of dierentiated
goods. Thus, to maximize the growth eect, the tax rate on prot should be zero.
In the Barro model, when the government only imposes a tax on household income, the
growth-maximizing policy is equivalent to the welfare-maximizing policy.21 However, in this
21If the government can use consumption or lump-sum tax, welfare is increasing in government spending as
well as the growth rate, as discussed in Section 5. That is, there is no welfare-maximizing government spending
level.
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study, the welfare-maximizing public research spending, Gw, is lower than the growth-maximizing
public research spending, Gg. As mentioned above, higher public research spending decreases
the household consumption expenditure. Therefore, there exists a trade-o between house-
hold consumption expenditure and the growth of dierentiated goods. When the government
increases public research spending to maximize the growth rate, this harms household consump-
tion expenditure, and thus the welfare-maximizing public research spending level is below the
growth-maximizing level.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we developed an R&D-based growth model to examine the eects of public
research spending on private R&D activities. We nd that a zero-prot tax maximizes growth
and welfare at the steady state. Furthermore, the growth-maximizing public research spending
level is above the welfare-maximizing level. We also nd that the equilibrium is indeterminate
when government debt, consumption, and prot tax are suciently small and asset income tax
is suciently large.
Finally, this study is a rst-generation R&D-based growth model that exhibits scale eects.
For future research, it would be interesting to consider the non-scale growth model.22
Appendix
A. Derivation of the Jacobian matrix
From (17) and (18), we obtain
_G =
f(G)
f 0(G)

1  t
"

f(G)E   f(G)(1 G) + 1


tE +
t
"

E  G

;
_E = E

1


G 

tE +
t
"

E

  

:
Approximating these equations linearly in the neighborhood of the steady states, the following
elements of the Jacobian matrix yield
JGG =
f(G)
f 0(G)

1  t
"

f 0(G)E   f 0(G)(1 G)  f(G)

+
f(G)
f 0(G)()2

  +
n
tE +
t
"

E  G
o tA
1  tA
f 0(G)
(f(G))2

;
22See Jones (1995) for a more detailed discussion of scale eects in R&D-based growth models.
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JGE =
f(G)
f 0(G)

1  t
"

f(G) +
1


tE +
t
"

;
JEG =
E
()2

 +
n
G  

tE +
t
"

E
o tA
1  tA
f 0(G)
(f(G))2

; and
JEE =  

tE +
t
"
E

:
From (20), we obtain 
1  t
"

f 0(G)E   f 0(G)(1 G)  f(G) = 0: (A.1)
By using (19) and (A.1), we can rewrite Jij (i; j = G;E) as follows:
JGG =   f(G
)
f 0(G)

1 + 
tA
1  tA
f 0(G)
(f(G))2

;
JGE =
f(G)
f 0(G)

1  t
"

f(G) +

tE +
t
"

;
JEG =
E


1 + 
tA
1  tA
f 0(G)
(f(G))2

;
JEE =  

tE +
t
"
E

:
B. Dynamics and stability when  = 0
From the denition of , the case where  = 0 implies that B > 0; tA > 0 or B = tA = 0.
First, we examine the case where B > 0; tA > 0. We dene G as f(G) = tA=(1  tA) B, that
is, G satises  = 0. When G = G, (9) and (13) yield E  G=(tE + t" ). Therefore,
_G = _E = 0 holds, and the economy jumps to the steady state immediately. This result seems
to imply that there are multiple steady states; G and G. However, G cannot hold the
no-arbitrage condition unless G = G. We rearrange equation (21) as follows:
B   tA
1  tA
1
f(G)| {z }
 
=
tE +
t
"
1  t"
1
f(G)
+
1


tE +
t
"
1  t"
  1 + tE
1  t"
G

: (B.1)
As shown in Figure B.1, the intersection of the LHS and RHS of (B.1) determines G. When
G 6= G, the following inequality holds:
tE +
t
"
1  t"
1
f(G)
+
1

 tE + t"
1  t"
  1 + tE
1  t"
G

> 0:
Thus, this inequality implies that the no-arbitrage condition cannot hold.
Second, we investigate the case where B = tA = 0. From (9) and (13), we obtain
G =

tE +
t
"

E: (B.2)
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Figure B.1 Figure B.2
Equations (6), (16), and (B.2) yield the following autonomous dynamic system, with respect to
G: 
1 +
f 0(G)G
f(G)
 _G
G
=
1  t"
tE +
t
"
f(G)G  f(G)(1 G)     (G):
Note that  (0) < 0 and  (G) is increasing in G (or U-shaped). As shown in Figure B.2, the
steady state is unstable, that is, the economy jumps to the steady state immediately.
C. Proof of Lemma
We examine the eects of the scal variables on G through changes in the scal variables.
The eect of B can easily be examined by using (21). When B increases, the horizontal line
goes up, as shown in Figure C.1. Thus, G decreases.
Figure C.1 Figure C.2
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Dierentiating (G) with respect to tA, tE , and t, we obtain
@
@tA

G given
=
1
(1  tA)2
1
f(G)
> 0;
@
@tE

G given
=
1
1  t"
n 1
f(G)
+
1

(L G)
o
> 0;
@
@t

G given
=
1 + tE
"
 
1  t"
2n 1f(G) + 1(L G)o > 0:
When the tax rates ti (i = A;E; ) increase, the graph of the RHS of (21) goes up (see Figure
C.2). Therefore, G increases.
D. Eects of  through changes in scal variables
Dierentiating  with respect to ti (i = E; ) yields
@
@ti
=   tA
1  tA
f 0(G)
(f(G))2
@G
@ti
: (i = E; )
By using the Lemma, we obtain @=@ti < 0 (i = E; ). To study the eect of B and tA, we
rewrite  using (22), as follows:
 =
1
(1  t" )

 

tE +
t
"


1
f(G)
 

tE +
t
"

+ (1 + tE)G


: (D.1)
Dierentiating  with respect to B and tA, we obtain
@
@ B
=
1
(1  t" )

tE +
t
"


f 0(G)
(f(G))2
+ (1 + tE)

@G
@ B
;
@
@tA
=
1
(1  t" )

tE +
t
"


f 0(G)
(f(G))2
+ (1 + tE)

@G
@tA
:
From the Lemma, @=@ B < 0 and @=@tA > 0 both hold.
E. Sign of (G)
We investigate the sign of (G) under _N > 0 (i.e., 0  G < G^). Dierentiating (G)
with respect to G, we obtain
0(G) =  f 0(G)(1 G) + f(G) Q 0 () G Q Gg:
Therefore, (G) and G follow a U-shape. Assumption (24) yields f(0) > ("   1)=(1   t),
and thus we obtain
(0) <  t   ("  1) t
1  t < 0:
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The denition of G^ yields
f(G^)(1  G^) = ("  1)
1  t : (E.1)
By using (E.1), we obtain
(G^) =  t("  t)
1  t < 0:
Thus, the sign of (G) is negative when 0  G < G^.
F. Condition of 
(0) > 0
From (33), the necessary condition for 
(0) > 0 is f 0(0) > f(0). In this case, @
(0)=@" < 0
apparently holds. Dierentiating 
(0) with respect to  and f 0(0) yields
@
(0)
@
=  

1 
f(0) + 
2 + 1"("  1)

f 0(0)  f(0)

< 0;
@
(0)
@f 0(0)
=
 2"("  1) + (f(0))2 + f(0)
"("  1)(f(0))2 + f(0)	 :
From the assumption in (24), we obtain  2"(" 1)+(f(0))2+f(0) > 0. Thus, @
(0)=@f 0(0) >
0 holds. From these results, when " and  are suciently small and f 0(0) is suciently large,

(0) > 0 holds.
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